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SUMMARY
Worldwide, countries face the challenge of securing
funds for health promotion. To address this issue,
some governments have established health promotion
foundations, which are statutory bodies with long-term
and recurrent public resources. This article draws on
experiences from Austria, Australia, Germany, Hungary
and Switzerland to illustrate four lessons learned from
the foundation model to secure funding for health
promotion. These lessons are concerned with: (i) the
broad spectrum of potential revenue sources for health
promotion foundations within national contexts; (ii) leg-
islative anchoring of foundation revenues as a base for
financial sustainability; (iii) co-financing as a means to
increase funds and shared commitment for health pro-
motion; (iv) complementarity of foundations to existing
funding. Synthesizing the lessons, we discuss health
promotion foundations in relation to wider concerns
for investment in health based on the values of sustain-
ability, solidarity and stewardship. We recommend
policy-makers and researchers take notice of health
promotion foundations as an alternative model for
securing funds for health promotion, and appreciate
their potential for integrating inter-sectoral revenue col-
lection and inter-sectoral funding strategies. However,
health promotion foundations are not a magic bullet.
They also pose challenges to coordination and public
sector stewardship. Therefore, health promotion foun-
dations will need to act in concert with other govern-
ance instruments as part of a wider societal agenda for
investment in health.
Key words: financing; funding; health promotion foundation; investment
INTRODUCTION
OECD countries allocate over 90% of public
expenditure on health to healthcare. Investment
in health promotion and disease prevention
amounts, on average, to 3.1% of public
expenditure on health: ranging between 0.7% in
Iceland and 6.6% in Canada (OECD, 2007;
data from 2005). More than two decades after
the Ottawa Charter and its call to reorient
health services towards health promotion
(WHO, 1986), financial commitment to health
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promotion remains small compared with cura-
tive services. While cross-country comparisons
of levels of health promotion spending seem
intricate due to conceptual and methodological
variations (Weinbrenner et al., 2007), there is
wide agreement that investment in health pro-
motion remains inadequate in view of rising
health inequalities and the growing prevalence
of chronic conditions such as obesity, hyperten-
sion and diabetes [e.g. (Bennett, 2003;
Bayarsaikhan and Muiser, 2007; Wise and
Nutbeam, 2007; WHO, 2009a; Ziglio et al.,
2000a)].
Worldwide, progress has been rather slow
when it comes to realizing and sustaining finan-
cing arrangements for health promotion (WHO,
2005). How to secure funds for health pro-
motion on a long-term basis, beyond short-term
political timeframes, is a growing concern in
many low-, middle- and high-income countries.
Government spending on population-wide
health promotion services tend to be ad hoc
and issue-based (Bennett, 2003; Bayarsaikhan
and Muiser, 2007). Conventional funding by
government agencies is also vulnerable to
annual budget revisions and to changing priori-
ties in response to electoral cycles. To achieve
sustained investment in health promotion,
there is a need to explore alternative models
of securing funds for health promotion
(Tangcharoensathien et al., 2009).
Health promotion foundations may be such a
model. Health promotion foundations are statu-
tory bodies endowed with long-term and recur-
rent public resources for promoting health
(Carroll, 2004; Mouy and Barr, 2006). The
Nairobi Call to Action, adopted in 2009 by the
participants of the 7th Global Conference on
Health Promotion, promoted this model by
urging countries to ‘secure adequate financing
by establishing stable and sustainable financing
at all levels, for example health promotion foun-
dations’ (WHO, 2009b, p. 4).
Health promotion foundations have been
described as an Australian invention intended
to tackle the public health problems of tobacco
sponsorship (Holman et al., 1996). In the 1980s
and early 1990s, four Australian states estab-
lished health promotion foundations to manage
a dedicated levy on tobacco taxes. Health pro-
motion foundations were used to invest those
funds in tobacco sponsorship replacement and
other health promotion activities (Carroll,
2004). Foundations continue in two Australian
states, Victoria (VicHealth) and Western
Australia (Healthway). Since then, several
countries and states have established health
promotion foundations, such as Austria,
Switzerland, Thailand, Singapore, Korea,
Malaysia, Mongolia and Tonga. Funding
approaches have diversified over time and
between countries. The growing experiences
from health promotion foundations in securing
funds for health promotion may be useful for
various countries looking for their own models
of financing health promotion.
The aim of our study was to investigate how
and why health promotion foundations can
secure funding for health promotion. Here we
draw on experiences from three foundations in
high-income countries—the Victorian Health
Promotion Foundation (VicHealth), the
Austrian Health Promotion Foundation and
Health Promotion Switzerland—to illustrate
four lessons learned from the foundation
model. We also integrate experiences from
Germany and Hungary, where efforts have
failed to secure long-term funding within a
health promotion foundation. Subsequently, we
synthesize these lessons in relation to wider con-
cerns for investment for health. We conclude
with implications for research and policy.
METHODS
Data for this article were collected between
February and August 2010. We followed a case
study method which is ‘an empirical inquiry
that investigates a contemporary phenomenon
within its real-life context, especially when the
boundaries between phenomenon and context
are not clearly evident’ (Yin, 1994, p. 13). The
approach is therefore well-suited to explore the
diverse and presumably context-dependent
(Carroll, 2004) financing of health promotion
foundations. Data were triangulated as we inte-
grated multiple sources of evidence including
scientific and grey literature obtained through
PubMed, Web of Science, EconLit, Google and
Google. Scholar; annual reports of the foun-
dations; and eight expert telephone interviews.
A set of questions was developed to guide data
collection.
We used purposive sampling to identify
experts from within and from outside the foun-
dations whose profound insight could help to
deepen understanding of the case (Gray, 2009).
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Interviewees for each existing foundation
included one high-ranking foundation staff
member (two Chief Executives and one Head
of Knowledge Management) and one external
expert (two professors knowledgeable on the
topic and one Head of Section in a Health
Ministry). Interviews with a professor from
Hungary and a German Sickness Fund repre-
sentative served to integrate the experiences
from these countries. We assured anonymity to
the interviewees and gave them the opportunity
to comment on the results to enhance trust-
worthiness of conclusions.
The interviews were semi-structured; based
on a similar interview guide but conducted in a
flexible manner so as to capture novel themes
(Gray, 2009). Data collection and analysis were
informed by the notion of multiple layers of
context (Hinds et al., 1992). The presumed
embeddedness of a case into direct legislative,
economic and political contexts and meta con-
texts which embrace societal values, served as a
conceptual device for perusing the transcribed
interviews and documents collected. We used
thematic analysis (Silverman, 2001) to identify
themes or patterns by contrasting and compar-
ing different data sources and linking them back
to the theoretical framework. Here we present
and discuss four lessons that emerged from
thematic analysis.
RESULTS; LESSONS LEARNED FROM
HEALTH PROMOTION FOUNDATIONS
A broad spectrum of potential sources to
finance health promotion
Securing funding for health promotion starts
with finding a suitable funding source. Health
promotion foundations draw on a broad range of
funding sources, which are not necessarily
limited to the health sector (e.g. social insurance
contributions, health budget appropriations),
but can also originate from beyond the health
sector (e.g. dedicated tobacco taxes, sales-tax
appropriations, Table 1). However, country
experiences indicate that political and legislative
contexts may influence both choice and feasi-
bility of specific funding sources.
In Tobacco Act 1987, the Victorian Tobacco
Act stipulated a tobacco tax increase from 25 to
30% of the wholesale price, and earmarked the
revenues of the 5% tax increase to a new health
promotion foundation: VicHealth. This arrange-
ment served two purposes. First, raised prices
were intended to discourage tobacco consump-
tion financially. Second, tobacco tax revenues
were intended to be dedicated to health pro-
motion. The political context for this model was
favourable, as opinion polls showed high public
support for tobacco tax increases, even among
smokers, if these funds were invested into
health promotion. Funding health promotion
through a dedicated ‘sin’ tax was a worldwide
first and raised attention nationally and interna-
tionally (VicHealth, 2005).
In 1997, however, the High Court of
Australia invalidated state government tobacco
taxes, because constitutionally states may levy
taxes only for specific purposes. Ironically, the
earmarked levy for VicHealth might have been
the only constitutional element, but this was
never examined by the Court (Borland et al.,
2009). The state Health Department agreed to
resume financing VicHealth out of its budget.
Thereby, the separate health promotion finan-
cing stream merged with general health system
financing. Since 1998, funding for VicHealth
has been determined by the treasurer, as part
of Victoria’s annual health budget (VicHealth,
2005).
Also in 1998, the Austrian Health Promotion
Foundation was like VicHealth entrusted with
treasury appropriations as the funding source.
In contrast to VicHealth, these appropriations
are legislatively fixed and do not affect the
health budget. The Health Promotion Act
Table 1: Legislative funding sources of health promotion foundations
VicHealth (1987–97) VicHealth (since 1997) Health Promotion Switzerland Austrian Health
Promotion Foundation
Dedicated levy of 5% on





Levy of 2.4 CHF (E1.6) on top of
compulsory health insurance
premiums
Dedicated sum of E7.25
million from sales-tax
revenue
VicHealth (2006), GFCH (2009), Hofmarcher and Rack (2006).
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requires the Finance Ministry to deduct an ear-
marked, annual amount of E7.25 million from
sales-tax revenue, before this revenue is distrib-
uted among national and regional levels of gov-
ernment (Hofmarcher and Rack, 2006). It
seems that this choice was a political statement
to emphasize a whole-of-society approach to
health promotion financing.
The financing source had been discussed for a long
time. Eventually the tax-financed model was a politi-
cal decision, because the entire health system should
be involved, not only the social security system. This
was a big step. It was also a time when ideas like the
Ottawa Charter became more wide-spread. (Expert 3,
11 March 2010)
In Switzerland, the Sickness Insurance Act
(KVG, 1994) stipulates that Swiss health
insurers collect an annual surcharge of CHF2.4
(E1.6) from every insuree on behalf of Health
Promotion Switzerland. In contrast to the more
fundamental political choices in Austria and
Victoria, this financing source may have been
more path-dependent.
The choice of health insurance levies was probably
an ad-hoc-decision. This financing source was pro-
posed during larger revisions of the Sickness
Insurance Act, in analogy to the Swiss Accident
Prevention Foundation which is financed through
accident insurance. (Expert 5, 17 March 2010)
With initial support from WHO grants, a former
staff member of the Hungarian Health
Promotion Institute established the Health21
Hungarian foundation as a non-governmental
organization in 2003. Three options and attempts
to secure long-term financing, however, failed.
One idea was citizen engagement. Hungarian law
enables taxpayers to assign 1% of their personal
income tax to a foundation they indicate on their tax
declaration. But Health21 did not mobilize enough
supporters, because few tax-payers use their right,
and foundations engaged in culture, animal protec-
tion and other fields are competing.
Insurance surcharges and a dedicated tax were
unfeasible, too, mainly for economic reasons. (Expert
8, 4 March 2010)
Economic downturn faced by Hungary since
2004 resulted in budgetary restrictions of both
the Finance Ministry and the Hungarian
National Insurance Fund, which suffers from low
insurance contributions and rising health-care
costs (Makara and Nemeth, 2009). In this
context, investment in health promotion as
‘extra services’ might have been considered pol-
itically delicate. Even though contextual factors
may not always impede efforts to secure funding
at all, they can limit the spectrum of available
funding sources. In Victoria, for instance, the
junction between health promotion funding and
health system financing became necessary for
legal–constitutional reasons. Nevertheless,
within context-specific limits, the country
examples presented here reveal various potential
sources to finance health promotion.
Co-financing to increase funds and shared
commitment for health promotion
In quantitative terms, the funds allocated to
health promotion foundations are but a drop in
the ocean compared with total health expendi-
ture in the respective countries. However,
country experience suggests that co-financing
can serve as a means to increase funds and
shared commitment for health promotion
(Table 2).
While projects funded by VicHealth usually
receive funding from other sources but
co-financing is not an explicit principle (Expert
1, 15 March 2010), the Austrian Health
Promotion Foundation and Health Promotion
Switzerland normally fund one- to two-thirds
of acknowledged project costs. In 2008, total
project costs in Switzerland amounted to
E19.6 million. Health Promotion Switzerland
contributed, on average, 38.6%. The Austrian
Health Promotion Foundation invested E4.24
million into projects; only 17% of the total
project costs. The remaining 83% were assumed
by providers or external partners such as
government or the insurance sector. Thereby,
E20.16 million was mobilized for health
promotion projects.
Historical evidence for the Austrian Health
Promotion Foundation suggests that the
co-financing principle may have increased
health promotion expenditure of other sectors:
while the available budget of the Foundation
remained stable, the amount of total
co-financed project costs rose from E9 million
in 1996 to E14 million in 2001 (Kirschner et al.,
2006) to E20.16 million in 2008 (FGÓ́, 2009a):
Thanks to the increasing reputation and high quality
standards of the Foundation, a grant from the
Foundation often serves as door-opener to other
funds. One could argue that funds allocated to the
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Foundation reflect rather symbolic commitment, but
co-financing arrangements make them quite consider-
able. (Expert 2, 11 March 2010)
Although co-financing would always entail
opportunity costs, it appears that health pro-
motion foundations can, even with their own
rather small revenues, multiply available funds
for health promotion through inter-sectoral
co-financing action. Nevertheless, since 2009,
the Austrian Health Promotion Foundation
offers full financing to small- and medium-sized
companies. As these members of the industrial
sector are seen as particular victims of the econ-
omic crisis, full financing shall encourage health
promotion projects despite economic constraints
(FGÓ́, 2009b). Thus, co-financing may increase
funds and shared commitment for health pro-
motion, but its appropriateness apparently
depends also on the type of grant receiver and
the economic climate.
Legislative anchoring of foundation revenues
as a base for financial sustainability
The health promotion foundations studied
receive dedicated public resources. This has
enhanced the financial sustainability of
foundation budgets and enables ongoing
funding commitment. But despite legislative
anchoring, volatilities in revenues can be
observed.
Until 1997, the budget for VicHealth could, in
theory, fluctuate depending on the amount of
tobacco tax revenue. VicHealth was initially
funded from a 5% hypothecation of tobacco
taxes, meaning that increased tax revenue would
increase funds for VicHealth. As tobacco tax
revenue has indeed been constantly rising
between 1989 and 1992 (VicHealth, 2006),
despite a price-responsive decrease in consump-
tion of dutied tobacco products (Scollo and Lal,
2007) and due to rising tobacco tax rates (Scollo,
2008), it remains unclear why VicHealth’s
budget decreased during that time. In 1992, fol-
lowing a fiscal crisis, funds for VicHealth were
capped without inflation adjustment at E17
million. Thus, hypothecation became nominal
only. Between 1993 and 1996, funds were capped
again at E15 million. In 1996/97, an indexation
of 3% was introduced in order to adjust for
inflation (VicHealth, 2006), which slightly
exceeds the average inflation rate of about 2.8%
between 1996 and 2008 (authors’ calculations
based on CPI, 2010). In 2007/08, VicHealth’s
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Total project costs E19.6 million
(including E7.56 million
contributed by the foundation)
E23.41 million
Total project costs: E20.16 million
(including E4.24 million
contributed by the foundation)
Remaining funds of the
foundation: E5.34 milliong
Remaining funds of the
foundation: E3.25 millionh
Budget per permanent
resident in 2008 including
the impact of co-financing
E3.9 (plus x) E3.2 E2.8
aAustrian Institute for Health and Welfare (n.d.), Swiss Federal Council (2009), Austrian Institute of Statistics (2010).
bBased on VicHealth (2009b), GFCH (2009). All exchange rates from 31 July 2010.
cBased on AUD 30.8 million appropriated by Government; total income including investment was AUD 32.7 million/
E22.7 million (cf. VicHealth, 2009b).
dBased on CHF 16.73 million from insuree surcharges; total income including interest/investment and not exhausted project
grants was CHF 17.39 million/E12.8 million (cf. GFCH, 2009).
eAuthors’ calculations based on: 5.43 million permanent residents in Victoria (www.census.abs.gov), 7.7 million in
Switzerland (www.bfs.admin.ch), 8.3 million in Austria (www.statistik.at).
fPersonal estimations based on GFCH (2009), FGÓ́ (2009a).
gThese are allocated to research, conferences, services, campaigns and administrative expenditure.
hIbid.
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budget again reached the level of 1989/90
(VicHealth, 2009a). Nevertheless, given annual
depreciation, VicHealth’s budget remained
stable after the capping of the appropriations.
Health Promotion Switzerland’s budget
depends on the number of insurees, i.e. resident
population size. Corresponding to increasing
population growth (from 0.2% in 1997 to 1.4%
in 2008, mainly due to foreign nationals assum-
ing residence in Switzerland; BAS, 2010), the
revenue base for Health Promotion Switzerland
has been constantly rising. However, the levy
per insuree was never inflation-adjusted. Given
an average annual inflation rate of 1% between
1996 and 2008 (personal calculations based on
IndexMundi, 2010), the budget increased in
absolute terms, but decreased relative to the
purchasing power by 12%.
In contrast to the other foundations, the
Austrian Health Promotion Foundation has a
legislatively determined budget of E7.25 million.
Due to an average inflation rate of 2%, however,
this amount has depreciated by 20% between
1998 and 2008 (authors’ calculations based on
WKO, 2010). Demanding a budget increase has
been delicate in Austria, partly because avail-
able funds were not utilized (Kirschner et al.,
2006). Paradoxically, it seems that the reason
was not a lack of need but a lack of capacity:
The first public health-education programmes in
Austria started end of the 1990s, so initially few pro-
fessionals were qualified to apply for project funding.
But by now legislative anchoring of funds has prob-
ably helped to sustain continuous funding. (Expert 4,
11 March 2010)
Thus, country experiences suggest that legisla-
tive ring-fencing tends to improve financial sus-
tainability, but can be challenged by factors
such as lack of professional capacity, fiscal
crises or gradual depreciation of funds.
Complementarity of foundations to existing
funding
Considering the overall societal investment in
health promotion, the key issue is whether
health promotion foundations will in concert
with other financing tools increase available
funds for health promotion, or whether these
remain at the same level. As experience from
Germany and Victoria illustrates, the establish-
ment of a new funding agency does not necess-
arily add new funds on top of existing resources.
In Germany, the Ministry of Health failed
twice, in 2005 and 2007, to establish a health pro-
motion foundation intended to be jointly financed
by sickness funds, accident, pension and long-term
care insurance (BMG, 2007). Critics, however,
pointed to the lack of involvement of unemploy-
ment insurance— refused by the Employment
Ministry—and of private insurers, although these
sectors were seen as profiting from health pro-
motion measures. While the reasons for failure of
a German health promotion foundation also
related to legal–constitutional obstacles, the pol-
itical–ethical debate centred on using a health
promotion foundation to relieve government-
funded public health services at the expense of
social security (Hajen, 2006; SpiK, 2007; Wanek,
2008). Concerns had been raised that a health pro-
motion foundation would merely reshuffle funds.
Insurers welcomed the tentative inter-sectoral
arrangement, but a key issue was the possible shifting
of tasks from underfinanced public health services to
social security. (Expert 7, 17 March 2010)
VicHealth indeed assumed financing for some pre-
viously government-funded programmes, such as
the tobacco control programme ‘Quit’ (Borland
et al., 2009). Due to cost- and task-shifting from
government, VicHealth replaced rather than com-
plemented existing funding. Arguably, VicHealth’s
funding source, the state health budget, weakens
the negotiation position of the foundation in this
respect. The Austrian Health Promotion
Foundation and Health Promotion Switzerland,
however, are legally protected against cost- and
task-shifting. They are not mandated to fund obli-
gatory government or social insurance tasks
(GFCH, 2002; FGÓ́, 2009c).
Moreover, all foundations studied seem to
achieve distinctiveness through a mix of inter-
sectoral funding strategies. This mix ranges
across funding practice projects, research, evalu-
ation, networking, workforce development and
capacity-building in cooperation with sectors
such as local and/or regional government,
private sector enterprises, education and
research institutions, non-governmental and
community organizations (GFCH, 2002; FGÓ́,
2009a; VicHealth, 2009a). Thus, it seems that
health promotion foundations can, based on leg-
islative provisions and their own initiative,
indeed complement existing forms of health pro-
motion funding by government and social
insurance.
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DISCUSSION
The lessons presented in this article suggest that
health promotion foundations can mobilize
complementary funding for health promotion
on a long-term basis. However, their financial
sustainability can also be challenged and their
financial contribution remains relatively small.
Building on the notion of multiple layers of
context (Hinds et al., 1992), we relate these
lessons to a possible meta-context of securing
funds for health promotion. As a synthesis, we
propose an inter-sectoral governance perspec-
tive on investment for health.
Securing funds for health promotion: how much
is needed?
While current resources for health promotion
are perceived as insufficient [e.g. (Bennett, 2003;
Wise and Nutbeam, 2007)], there seem to be few
attempts at quantification on how many funds
would be needed to reorient health services
towards health promotion. Tangcharoensathien
et al. (2005) recommend governments invest at
least 15% of government expenditure into
health promotion and prevention. This would
represent a significant leap, given current health
promotion expenditure according to OECD
data. On the other hand, scholars questioning
the effectiveness of health promotion argue that
any extra resources spent in this area will not
necessarily yield value for money (Lüngen et al.,
2009).
The quantity of resources needed for health
promotion apparently remains a controversial
issue. However, the lessons presented here also
point to a meta-context of societal values such
as solidarity, sustainability and stewardship.
Recognized as highly relevant to financing
health systems (WHO, 2000, 2005), these values
may therefore be worth considering for health
promotion financing.
Solidarity: who should pay for health
promotion?
Solidarity as ‘society’s sense of collective
responsibility’ (WHO, 2005, p. 13) suggests that
investment in health may also legitimize the
involvement of actors beyond the health sector
in financing this investment. However, complex
causal pathways and a long time lag in health
outcomes mean that those required to pay may
not be the direct, nor the only, beneficiaries of
their investment (Bayarsaikhan and Muiser,
2007). In Germany, even the proposed pooling
of funds from four different branches of social
security was deemed unfair, given the potential
for free-riding by government, private insurance
and unemployment services (Hajen, 2006).
The lessons from health promotion foun-
dations suggest a more holistic perspective on
solidarity that reconciles inter-sectoral funding
sources and inter-sectoral allocation arrange-
ments. Funds may be levied by the health insur-
ance sector, but ultimately the entire resident
population can pay for and benefit from health
promotion action. This applies to Switzerland,
where health insurance is mandatory for all resi-
dents. Similarly, in Austria, the amount of sales-
tax revenue earmarked for the foundation is
channelled through the industrial sector. Yet,
the fact that this revenue is normally distributed
among all levels and sectors of government
(Hofmarcher and Rack, 2006) also renders
health promotion financing a shared societal
goal.
While the Austrian Industry Association criti-
cized that health insurers, as alleged main bene-
ficiaries of improved population health, were
not involved in the collection side (ÖGV, 1998),
insurers may still contribute as co-financing
agents on the allocation side. Interestingly,
co-financing can serve as a channel for inter-
sectoral solidarity, but full financing, for
example to small- and medium-sized Austrian
companies due to the economic recession, can
also strengthen solidarity in terms of the pre-
sumed ability to pay. Such acknowledgement of
the needs of other sectors, in turn, represents a
key to effective action on the social determi-
nants of health (Kickbusch, 2010).
Sustainability and stewardship: a trade-off?
In securing funds for health promotion, policy-
makers may face a trade-off between strengthen-
ing sustainability and stewardship, as two con-
trasting financing models illustrate. Government
agencies, on the one hand, represent the
traditional approach to achieving stewardship,
but they are also the most vulnerable to
annual budget revisions and spending cuts
(Tangcharoensathien et al., 2009). Classic private
foundations, in contrast, tend to use a secured
capital stock to finance specific purposes (Brand
and Brand, 2000). Whereas this may strengthen
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financial sustainability, opportunities for public
sector stewardship are likely to be limited.
Health promotion foundations could alleviate
potential sustainability-stewardship trade-offs.
From the viewpoint of sustainability, health pro-
motion foundations are entrusted with legisla-
tively secured resources. Yet, in terms of
stewardship, country experience indicates that
legislative ring-fencing still enables upward or
downward adjustment of funds. While this
observation seems to contradict long-term plan-
ning for health promotion, a certain flexibility
in the moving of funds between government
activities might also enable more effective
responses to societal needs (Lin et al., 2008).
The statutory character of health promotion
foundations, which allows relative freedom from
political interference, may nevertheless threaten
stewardship. Relative independence in daily
operations and strategic planning can create
coordination problems between foundations
and Health Ministries (Mouy and Barr, 2006).
Achieving joint stewardship with governments
may be a major challenge for health promotion
foundations, but arguably also one of their core
potentials. Their ability to operate beyond
rather narrow remits of single Ministries also
facilitates inter-sectoral collaboration (Carroll,
2004). Thereby, health promotion foundations
can, based on overall accountability to govern-
ment, provide added value for public benefit
across sectoral lines.
A synthesis: governing investment in health
promotion through inter-sectoral action
An inter-sectoral perspective based on govern-
ance tools may help to frame the quest of secur-
ing funds for health promotion (St. Pierre,
2009). This entails thoughtful integration of
micro-level analysis of single instruments, such
as health promotion foundations, inter-
departmental committees or community consul-
tations, into macro-level policy frameworks such
as Health in All Policies and Investment for
Health, which emphasize the linkages between
health, wealth and inter-sectoral collaboration
(Wismar et al., 2006; Ziglio et al., 2000b).
As the Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control is rolled out, more countries may be
looking at health promotion foundations as an
approach to dedicate ‘sin taxes’ levied on
tobacco to health promotion action including,
but going beyond, tobacco control. Various
countries especially in the Asian-Pacific region
are at different stages of adapting the model to
their contexts (VicHealth, 2005). Building on
the experience of VicHealth, Thailand, for
example, has dedicated 2% of the tobacco and
alcohol excise tax revenue to a national health
promotion foundation, ThaiHealth, to foster
institutional development and programme deliv-
ery for health promotion (Buasai et al., 2007).
This serves as a role model to other low- and
middle-income countries (WHO, 2010).
Thailand has also mentored the development of
new health promotion foundations, for example
in Mongolia (Lin and Fawkes, 2006). The trans-
ferability of the foundation model to different
national contexts illustrates the potential for
cross-country learning. However, the experi-
ences from Germany and Hungary also reveal
how and why political, legal and economic con-
texts might impede the establishment of a
health promotion foundation.
Even if policy entrepreneurs succeed in adapt-
ing the foundation model to a particular national
context, single financing instruments are unlikely
to change root causes of health inequalities.
They will arguably remain limited in the context
of potentially health-damaging supranational
policies such as the Common Agricultural Policy
of the European Union, and insufficient invest-
ment for health at national level, including
public health education (Expert 4, 11 March
2010). To make a difference based on the limited
resources they have, health promotion foun-
dations arguably need two essential aspects for
effective inter-sectoral action: they require
embeddedness into a wider health promotion
infrastructure (Ziglio et al., 2000a), and they
need to be enabled to act as change agents in
collaborative action based on partnerships
(Mouy and Barr, 2006).
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
AND RESEARCH
We suggest policy-makers and scholars should
appreciate the inspiring alternatives for securing
funds for health promotion that health pro-
motion foundations offer. This includes legis-
lation as a means to promote financial
sustainability and complementarity, a range of
potential funding sources beyond governmental
health budgets and opportunities for inter-
sectoral action.
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In principle, the concept of health promotion
foundations seems adaptable to various
countries. However, health promotion foun-
dations are not a magic bullet. Failed attempts to
institute a health promotion foundation in some
countries indicate the attractiveness, but also the
limited transferability of this financing instru-
ment in relation to political, legal and economic
contexts. The Adelaide Statement on Health in
All Policies (WHO/SA, 2010) emphasizes the
need for collaborative and inter-sectoral govern-
ance in order to tackle the social determinants
of health and health inequalities such as edu-
cation, environment, housing and employment.
To prevent duplication and fragmentation,
health promotion foundations therefore require
needs based integration into existing health pro-
motion infrastructures and coordination with
other governance tools. The Adelaide Statement
explicitly calls for jointly reviewing innovative
mechanisms and instruments to achieve a unified
health promotion strategy. Thus, a useful next
step for the future policy and research agenda
might be to map and compare the added value
of various governance tools, which may then
contribute to implementing Health in All
Policies within national contexts worldwide.
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Ausländische Bevölkerung: Staatsangehörigkeit
[Migration and Integration Indicators; Foreign
Population: Nationality]; http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/
portal/de/index/themen/01/07/blank/key/01/01.html (last
accessed 1 March 2010).
Bayarsaikhan, D. and Muiser, J. (2007) Financing Health
Promotion. Discussion paper number 4, World Health
Organization, Geneva.
Bennett, J. (2003) Investment in Population Health in Five
OECD Countries. OECD Health Working Paper No. 2,
OECD, Paris.
BMG–Bundesministerium für Gesundheit [Federal
Ministry of Health]. (2007) Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur
Stärkung der gesundheitlichen Prävention. [Proposal of
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